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JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE UNDER SIEGE
Wendell Fennell*
Fred Young"
Our Constitution and applicable statutes provide as a fundamental
right of all citizens to have their meritorious case(s) heard and decided
by an impartial adjudicator whether in an Article III or administrative
tribunal. It is common knowledge that an absolute necessary element
for the existence of an impartial adjudicator is judicial independence.
However, it is of great concern to all of us who believe in the idea of
impartiality and fairness that this necessary element of judicial
independence is under such intense attack. The attacks emanating from
those within the leadership roles of the administrative bureaucracies
include the agencies' leaders and the government attorneys (Offices of
General Counsel) in the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and
Social Security Administration (SSA).1
Perhaps the most widely publicized attack is within the SSA;
however, attempts to destroy judicial independence is not at all limited
to SSA. The USDA attack (primarily commencing in 1995) on the
independence of the National Appeals Division (NAD) Hearing
Officers is manifested in various and obvious ways. Congress
mandated the establishment of the NAD when it enacted P.L. 103-3 54
on October 13, 1994. The NAD is an expansion of the National
Appeals Staff (NAS). The Agricultural Credit Act of 1987 followed a
Federal District Judge's decision, in Coleman v. Block, wherein the
court ordered a permanent injunction against the USDA because the
department was violating the rights of program participants. Congress
*Wendell Fennell is a Hearing Officer with the USDA, National Appeals Division.
**Fred Young is a Hearing OFficer with the USDA, National Appeals Division.
'The head of the SSA warned the department ALJs they would be subject to
disciplinary action if they did not conform their opinions to internal policy. In response to this
attack on judicial independence, Congressman George Gekas introduced H.R. 1544 which is
known as the Federal Agency Compliance Act. H.R 1544 was approved by the Subcommittee
on Commercial and Administrative Law and was forwarded to the full Judiciary Committee
by voice vote on July 24, 1997.
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saw the need to correct this injustice by mandating the establishment of
the NAS. The NAS reported to the Administrator of the Farmer Home
Administration, an obvious opportunity for interference. As Congress
viewed the operation of the NAS and appeals in other USDA agencies,2
it became apparent that their intent of judicial independence was not
being met; thus, Congress mandated the establishment of the NAD.
Congress expressly mandated the independence of the NA). 3 Since the
enacting of P.L. 103-354,4 the internal attacks and undermining of the
NAD's independence has intensified, and unfortunately the attackers
have had some success.
Today, the NAD Hearing Officers are under attack from within the
NAD and from the agency heads and Office of General Counsel.
The NAD Hearing Officers experience their decisions being
reversed by the Director of the NAD without merit and in many
cases in obvious conflict with law and fact. P.L. 103-354 provides
for the review (appeals) of Hearing Officers' decisions by the
NAD Director. This review is available to the appellants and the
agencies under certain constraints.
It is clear from the following facts and analysis (the study period
covers about one year) that the NAD Western Region5 (20-25 Hearing
2In Dotyv. USDA, Nos. 94-5014, 94-5013 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 12, 1995), and 96-5131
(Fed. Cir. Mar. 21, 1997), the court found that the Agriculture Stabilization and Conservation
Service's (ASCS) National Appeals Division was abusive and unfair. The Doty matter was
subject to an appeal before the ASCS' s National Appeals Division that was in place prior to
enactment of P.L. 103-354. P.L. 103-354 established the USDA National Appeals Division.3p.L. 103-354, §272(c) mandates that: "The Director shall be free from the
direction and control of any person other than the Secretary. The Division shall not receive
administrative support (except on a reimbursable basis) from any agency other than the
Office of the Secretary. The Secretary may not delegate to any other officer or employee of
the Department, other than the Director, the authority of the Secretary with respect to the
Division."
4The part of P.L. 103-354 that established the USDA National Appeals Divsion is
codified at 7 U.S.C. §699, et seq.
I Includes all states west of the Mississippi River except Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri,
Arkansas, and Louisiana.
Officers) Hearing Officer's decisions are reversed when they reverse6
the agencies and are upheld (affirmed) when they uphold the agencies:
FACTS
1. Hearing Officers' decisions reviewed by the Director of NAD: 83
2. Reversed decisions: 73
3. Upheld (affirmed) decisions: 10
4. Reversed decisions (reversed by Hearing Officers) reversed by
Director: 58
5. Upheld decisions reversed by Director: 2 (prior to September
1997 the number of upheld cases that were reversed by the
Director was zero)
ANALYSIS
7
In 79% of the cases where an agency was reversed by a Hearing
Officer, the Director reversed the Hearing Officer. Whereas in only
two of the ten cases (20%) where an agency was upheld by a Hearing
Officer, the Director reversed the Hearing Officer.
In order to understand the significance of the impact on judicial
independence of the above matter, the contexts of case-by-case merit,
exparte communications, and strategic planning should be considered.
However, the context of case-by-case merit in terms of fact and law is
beyond the scope of this paper.
The consideration contexts within the scope of this paper are (1)
the context of ex parte communications that is occurring between the
NAD Director and the USDA's Office of General Counsel, and (2) the
6When a Hearing Officer reverses the Agency' s decision, this is a finding for the
Appellant.
7Most of the NAD Hearing Officer determinations are not reviewed. It should be
understood that the NAD Hearing Officers reverse the Agencies only about 35% of the time.
The analysis provided only applies to this 35% (88% OF THE REVIEW CASES) PLUS THE
FEW CASES WHERE APPELLANTS SEEK REVIEW (12%).
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context of the 5-year Strategic Plan for the NAD.'
EXPARTE COMMUNICATIONS
Some of the Hearing Officers' decisions that are before the
Director on review are reviewed with the Office of General Counsel
prior to the Director's review determinations. These ex parte matters
are not revealed to the appellants (USDA program participants), thus,
the appellants are not allowed to respond to the Office of General
Counsel's position. When the Director reverses a Hearing Officer's
decision based on an ex parte communication with the agencies'
attorneys, the Director's decision is obviously unfair and flawed.
Notwithstanding, these flawed decisions will be included in the Hearing
Officer's total of reversed decisions.
STRATEGIC PLAN
In the Director's original 5-year Strategic Plan (published on the
USDA home page), it is clear that Hearing Officers will be punished for
reversing the agencies.9 The following is quoted:
Incorrect hearing officer determinations are overturned by
the Director. Occasionally, a determination may be
overturned on the basis of new information or other factors
beyond the hearing officer's control, but in general,
reversals or remands of hearing officer determinations are
indicators of hearing officer error. Appropriate
adjudication procedures and rational decision making will
'he NAD 5-year Strategic Plan was filed under "What's New" on USDA's internet
home page on July 9, 1997. The point is being made that the Hearing Officers' decisions are
reversed based on one-sided communications with the agencies' attorneys and these reversals
will be used to pressure the Hearing Officers into rendering decisions that uphold the agencies.
The planned intent is to force the Hearing Officers' decisions to some acceptable level of
reversal rate.
" The Director's reversal of the Hearing Officers' determinations including those
wrongfully reversed will be construed as error, thus, the Hearing Officers will bepunished by
a negative performance evaluation.
result in fewer reversals or remands. This objective, which
seeks to reduce the incidence of reversals or remands of
hearing officer determinations, will be reflected directly in
performance measures in all Annual Performance Plans.
Performance against stated targets will be reflected in the
performance plans of individual hearing officers.
(Emphasis added)
In addition to the attack on judicial independence as described
in the above contexts, intent to weaken or destroy judicial independence
is readily inferred from the language found in various documents
authorized by the NAD Director. One such document is NAD
Directive #1 wherein the USDA agencies are referred to as NAD
clients. This same language is found in the five-year strategic plan.
In another document the Director has instructed the Hearing Officers to
conform their decisions to the opinions of the agencies' attorneys. The
following is quoted from NAD Notes' ° dated November 1996:
Legal opinions provide the "generally applicable
interpretations" of the laws and regulations upon which
a determination must be based. The Office of General
Counsel (OGC), General Law Division, has advised that
legal opinions issued by regional OGC offices may be
relied upon as may opinions issued from OGC's
Washington office. The only exception is that the
Washington office opinion controls when there is a
conflict between the opinions of the Washington and
regional OGC offices.
In some cases the regional attorneys appear as counsel for the
agencies in appeals before the Hearing Officers. The ex parte review
with the agencies' attorneys is not only a violation of the exparte rule,
it also results in the violation of the 30-day limitation for the Director
review determinations. This leads to the infamous case, Passarell v.
1°The NAD Notes is a periodic internal documents containing announcements,
guidance, and instructions as to the NAD hearing issues.
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USDA, CA No. 95-2122, (D.D.C. Mar. 6, 1997), wherein the Agency's
attorney(s) argued that "shall" in a statute directing the NAD Director
to render his review determination within 30 days was merely
"aspirational." The court found the agency's construction of "shall"
was nonsensical and placed their argument within the context of George
Orwell's celebrated work, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FouR. Orwell's prophesy
that the government would reverse the meaning of words in order to
achieve its intent applies here. If the Hearing Officers are coerced into
conforming their decision to satisfy agency intent, they would not only
be deciding contrary to established law, they would subject themselves
to considerable embarrassment. The first "shall" be avoided and the
latter should be avoided.
The mission of the NAD was originally established by the
Agricultural Credit Act of 1987, and that mission remains the same
although enlarged jurisdictionally. The mission is to provide USDA
program participants that have experienced adverse determinations a
fair hearing before a fair Hearing Officer. However, according to a
letter from the Office of General Counsel to Senator Phil Gramm of
Texas dated September 2, 1997, this mission has been reversed from
providing a fair hearing before a fair Hearing Officer to that of
(quoted):
We p'oint out that Congress established NAD in order to
ensure closer adherence to statutory and regulatory
guidelines in distributing program benefits. That such
closer adherence to statute and regulation would result
in an increase in participant dissatisfaction that is
manifest in an increased number of lawsuits should not
be particularly remarkable.
While it is true that closer adherence to statutory and regulatory
guidelines is one desirable result of any adjudication, this desirable
result applies equally to the program participants and the agencies.
Apparently the agencies and their attorneys would have us believe
"closer adherence to statutory and regulatory guidelines" only applies
to the program participants. Congress did not mandate the
establishment of the NAD so that agencies could appeal the actions of
participants; it is the reverse.
The agency's interpretation of Congressional purpose or
mission of the NAD is that of assisting the agencies in ensuring that
only the participants (appellants) more closely follow statutory and
regulatory guidelines is error. The agency's interpretation of
Congressional intent as to the NAD mission has gone through an
Owellian metamorphism such that fair hearings and fair decisions is
now providing assistance to the agencies in ensuring the participants
more closely follow statutory and regulatory guidelines. The Senate's"
(the NAD bill originated in the Senate) construction of the NAD Bil
included the hopeful result that the Bill would reduce participant
lawsuits because the NAD would provide a fair hearing and decision.
Congress 2 intended for the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) and the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) to apply to the
NAD Hearings; however, the agencies' attorneys 3 erroneously
promulgated rules that were in conflict with Congressional intent.
These rules were allowed to stand (internally) as controlling law until
recently overturned by the Courts in Lane v. USDA, Norman G.
Cooper, et al., 120 F. 3d 106 (8th Cir., 1997). The District Court first
ruled "'4 that the APA and EAJA applied to the NAD hearings and that
the applicable regulation promulgated by the USDA was in error. This
ruling was upheld by the Eighth Circuit. The APA assists in fostering
the independence of the NAD and in leveling the playing field for the
"The Senate Bills were 3119 and 1425. The report language of the Department of
Agriculture Reorganization Act of 1994, Section 202, contains the following: "Subsection (a)
establishes the National Appeals Division (NAD), and requires that the provisions of the
Administrative Procedures Act (APA) shall apply to all appeals heard by NAD."
' The NAD bill that originated in the Senate (S. 1425) expressly mandated that the
APA apply; however, in conference with the House, much of the Senate' s specific language
was dropped. However, the enacted bill never contained language that prohibited APA
application. The Lane court correctly construed the non-specific language of P.L. 103-354
to imply application of the APA.
"Agencies (USDA) attorneys' promulgation of the NAD rules was independent of
the NAD's input.
'"Lane v. United States Department of Agriculture, 929 F. Supp. 1290 (D.N.D.
1996).
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program participants in their appeals before the NAD. The matter of
APA applicability has been a controversy since the Agriculture Credit
Act of 1987. In the early stages of the NAS, the Hearing Officers were
told not to use the words due process or fairness. Yet it seems obvious
to the reasonable mind that the independence and very existence of the
NAD (and the NAS) is directly tied to fairness (due process). The
OGC's disconnect of the NAD and the APA is just another way of
separating the NAD from judicial independence.
A great concern currently pervasive within the federal
government is non-acquiescence by the agencies as to Federal District
and Appellate Court rulings. The agencies have stubbornly taken the
position that they need not comply with rulings unless the U.S.
Supreme Court has spoken. Apparently, the agencies prefer to litigate
the matter in the District and Appellate Courts for as long as possible
or to defy the rulings until the matter is settled, if ever, in the Supreme
Court. In the case of Lane, it appears that this non-acquiescence policy
will be the strategy of the NAD leadership and the Office of General
Counsel.
If the agency leadership and its alter egos are allowed to reverse
the meaning of the language of controlling law and coerce the Hearing
Officers into rendering decisions that favor the agency's position,
judicial independence and fairness within the NAD will be nonexistent.
